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J. S. THOMPSON and JUDY C. THOMPSON 
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MUTUAL PRESS, INC. • LYNCHBURG, VA. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
J. S. THOMPSON and JUDY C. THOMPSON 
vs. 
EDNA C. THOMPSON 
Record No. 1957. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLEE'S CASE. 
The appellee states the following points as constituting 
her claim, which points will be hereinafter discussed in 
detail: 
(I). That her grantor, Herman C. Thompson, entered 
into ·a parol contract with R. D. ~Thompson for the 
purchase of land; that her grantor took possession 
of the said land, believing that he could and would 
get a good title thereto, and placed improvements 
and built up a valuable business thereon, to the 
extent that to deny him (or his grantee) a good 
deed thereto would work an irreparable hardship 
and injury that does not lie in compensation. 
( 2). That R. D. Thompson was either the real owner of 
the land at the time, although the legal title was 








agent of Judy C. Thompson, the owner and holder 
of the legal title, and that he; ·had a right to and did 
make a binding contract in her behalf. 
That her grantor was a bona fide purchaser of the 
land without notic~ of defects in title,-that, in fact, 
there were then no defects in title-that her grantor 
placed all the improvements on the land; that he 
had a right to demand a deed conveying him good 
title, and that she as his grantee or assignee has a 
right to assert any claim to the land that he could 
have asserted. 
-That the appellee controverts the appellants' state-
ment that she took title to the land with notice of 
defects in the title, and thereafter made improve-
ments on the land. 
That the identity of the land is fixed by monuments 
thereon, and the description of it is sufficient to entitle 
her to specific performance of the contract, or that, 
if the land is not sufficiently identified, then she, as 
the grantee of the purchaser, should be permitted 
to select the land within reasonable limits. 
That neither she nor her ·grantor is ~ilty of laches, 
and that the appellants are guilty of laches in assert-
ing their claim. . 
That the appellant Judy C. Thompson is not only 
guilty of laches in asserting her claim, but is guilty 
of legal fraud in permitting the improvements to be 
made, with full knowledge on her part that they 
were being made, and with full knowledge that the 
purchaser had bought the land by contract and was 
making the improvements under the belief that the 
contract was enforceable, and that he could and 
would get a: .good title to the land. 
That the appellant J. S. Thompson (co-defendant 
with Judy C. Thompson in ·the tri-a:I court}, ·before 
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he acquired an interest in the land, knew of the cir-
cumstances of the placing of improvements thereon 
by the purchaser and was affected with notice of the 
claim of the purchaser. 
{ 9·) That the trial court, having reached the conclusion 
(though erroneously) that the description of the land 
was too vague to warrant an award of specific per-
formance, rightly awarded the appellee damages. 
( 10). That the bill of complaint alleges, the testimony 
shows, and the appellants admit that the appellant 
Judy C. Thompson is insolvent, and that a judgment 
for damages against her would be unavailing, if the 
appellee sought remedy in a court of law, and that, 
therefore, a court of equity only can grant her full 
relief. 
(I 1). That the appellants recognized the claim of the 
appellee to the land both in their pleadings and by 
their acts. 
The appellee does not claim under a parol gift of land, 
as the appellants seem to think, but she does claim under 
a parol contract of sale of land, in part executed, entered 
into by her grantor, who transferred to her "all his right, 
title and interest" in the land. This will eliminate from 
consideration Section 5·141 of the Code of Virginia, and 
appellants' arguments based thereon. 
Statute inhibiting parol gift of land HELD inap-
plicable to verbal agreement with uncle, that n~phew 
should have land .in consideration of services, supported 
by eviden<:e of service. (Code I 919, Sec. 5 I 4 I ) . 
Frizzell v. Frizzell., 149 Va. 815, 141 S. E. 868. 
The appellee does not claim that she herself made any 
imp·rovements on the land after acquiring title thereto. All 
improvements were made by her grantor or assignor, 
Herman C. Thompson, l~ng before she ever acquired any 
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·interest in the hind and at a· time when there were no 
defects in title. Any alleged defects in title growing out of 
his purchase of the land could easily have been cured by 
his demanding a deed to the land, which he had a plain 
right to do. This eliminates the question of "purchasers for 
value, without (or with) notice of defects in title, who 
improve the land," and the many cases cited thereon. 
The appellee does not claim a right to recover under 
Section 5491 of the Code of Virginia, but she relies upon 
her right to recover under the rule of equity announced in 
Effinger v. Hall, infra, before Section 549 I was enacted. 
ASSIGNMENT OF CROSS-ERROR. 
The appellee assigns cross-error in that the trial court 
refused to grant specific performance of the contract of 
sale of the land. 
ARGUMENT. 
Before discussing the several points of the appellee's 
claim, it is desirable to point out the inapplicability of 
cases cited by the appellants as authorities. They are not 
in point for the following reasons : 
(I). Graeme v. Cullen, et als, 23 Gratt. 266, decided in 
I 873, states: "Here the building was not erected by 
a person in possession of the land, claiming it under 
a title believed by him to be good; but was erected 
by a person not in possession, nor claiming any title 
to the land," etc. The case is really authority for the 
appellee as hereinafter shown. Moreover, it is over-
ruled by Effinger v. Hall, infra. 
(2). 31 Corpus Juris 315 {Sec. 17) cites as its authority 
Graeme v. Culle~t, 23 Gratt. 266, and Morris v. 
Terrell, 2 Rand. 6, both of which are discussed and 
overruled by Effinger v. Hall, infra. 
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(3). Nixdorf v. Blount,- Va. -, 69 S. E. ~58, decides 
only agains~ ~he right to recover u~der the statute. 
It reads: "The right to allowance for improvements, 
under the Virginia statute, which is an innovation 
of the common law is confined to cases * * * . " This 
case considers the right to recover for improvements 
against a person holding a judgment lien only, and 
does not discuss the right to recover in equity laid 
down in Effinger v. Hall, infra. 
(4.) Branham v. Artrip, I IS Va. 314, 79 S. E. 391, 
decided in I 9 1 3, and alleged by the appellants to be 
"on all fours" with the present case, does not impinge 
on the c:loctrine laid down in Effinger v. Hall, either 
in express terll}s or by impljcation. Though citing 
Effinger v. Hall, infra., it does not discuss the doc-
trine therein laid down as a rule of equity permitting 
a complainant to recover independently of the sta-
tute._... The appellee did not rely on that doctrine, but 
he relied solely on the statute (Sec. 2706). The 
decision reads : 
"The appellee, to sustain the jurisdiction of a 
court of equity * * *, relies upon Sec. 2760 of 
the Code of J904 * * * ." (Now Sec! 5491). 
"It has repeatedly been held that the statutes 
relied on applies only to actions of ejectment, 
or to cases in which ~ decree or judgment is 
rendered against a defendant for land." 
But Effinger v. Hall was decided in 1885, and the 
right to recovery by a complainant was then promul-
gated as a rule of equity . . Sec. 5491 of the Code was 
not enacted until 1887. It did not undertake to take 
away the right given by equity to a complainant, but 
it .gave for the first time a right to a defendant in a 
law suit to recover for improvements. But the mere 
enactment Df Sec. 5491 in 18:87 did not deprive a 
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court of equity of its right to grant relief to a com-
plainant under the rule already adopted in I 8 8 5. 
Kabler v. Spencer's Administrator, 
I 14 Va. 589, 77 S. E. 504. 
( 5). Truslow v. Ball, I 8 6 S. E. 7 I, cites as its authority 
(p. 74) Graeme v. Cullen, supra., which is discussed 
in Effinger v. Hall, infra., and by it overruled to 
the extent that the older case states the harsh rule 
of the common law. The case does not mention 
Effinger v. Hall, infra., and the rule of equity therein 
adopted, nor does it undertake to overrule it. 
Moreover, all these cases deal with the question of "a 
purchaser with notice of a defect in title who makes 
improvements." The appellee "stands in the shoes of" her 
grantor, Herman C. Thompson, who certainly was not a 
"purchaser with notice of a defect in title," for reasons 
heretofore stated. Her grantor could have perfected his 
title at any time simply by demanding a deed, and he states 
that, had he demanded it, he would certainly have gotten 
a good deed. (Record p. I33). 
"Q. Did you believe and understand that if you 
came there and built the store and gave your father 
$xoo.oo, that he would deed you that land-did you 
believe that? 
A. Certainly I did. * * * * * 
Q. Do you believe now that had you at any time 
prior to your father's death tendered him $roo.oo and 
asked for a deed, that you would have gotten a deed 
to that tract of land on which that storehouse is 
located? 
A. I think I would." 
But Effinger v. Hall, 8 I Va. 94, cited by the appellants, 
instead of supporting their argument, is really authority 
for the appellee. The appellants merely quote from it cer-
tain cases which it discusses and then discards in favor of 
7 
a more liberal rule. It expressly denies the former rule in 
equity refusing a complainant the right to recover for 
improvements and for the first time grants that right to a 
complainant. Before that decision the right had been 
allowed only to a defendant. The decision reads : 
"And it never seems to have been decided until a 
comparatively recent period, that one who made bene-
ficial improvements on land, even though a bona fide 
purchaser, is entitled to reimbursement for his expen-
ditures, unless brought into court as a defendant at 
the suit of the owner praying an account of rents 
and profits, * * * * * 
"This principle was recognized in Walker v. 
Beuchler, 27 Gratt. 51 I, 528, where the defendant's 
claim for improvements was allowed, on the ground 
that by his acquiescence and laches the plaintiff was 
estopped from contesting it. * * * * *. 
"This decision is in harmony with the doctrine laid 
down by Judge Story, in his work on Equity, supra. 
But the question some years afterwards arose, and was 
differently decided, in Bright v. Boyd, in favor of a 
complainant, against whom a judgment in ejectment 
had been recovered for the possession of certain land 
which he had previously purchased at a judicial sale, 
and upon which he had put expensive improvements, 
supposing his title to be good. Judge Story, at the final 
hearing, thus stated the principle upon which he based 
his decision: 'I wish, in coming to this conclusion, to· be 
distinctly understood as affirming and maintaining the 
broad doctrine of equity, that so far as an innocent 
purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice 
of any infirmity in his title, has, by his improvements 
and meliorations, added to the permanent value of 
the estate, he is entitled to full remuneration, and that 
such increase of value is a lien and charge on the 
estate, which the absolute owner is bound to discharge 
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before he is restored to his original rights in the land. 
This is the clear result of the Roman law, and it has 
the most persuasive equity, and, I may add, common 
sense and common justice for its foundations.' S. C., 
2 Story, 6os." Effinger v. Hall, 81 Va. 108. 
This case was decided against the complainants, not 
because they were complainants, but because they were 
"purchasers with notice of a defective title." 
POINTS 
The several points of the appellee's case will now be 
considered in detail. 
Point 1 
·That her grantor, Herman C. Thompson, entered into 
a parol contract with R. D. Thompson for the purchase of 
land; that her grantor took possession of the said land, 
believing that he could and would get a good title thereto, 
and placed improvements and built up a valuable business 
thereon, to the extent that to deny him (or his grantee) a 
good deed thereto would work an irreparable hardship and 
injury that does not lie in compensation. 
Where bill alleged mother promised she would 
devise property to son for services rendered, but son 
testified mother promised to "give" him the property, 
there was no material variance. Cannon v. Cannon, 
158 Va. 12, 163 S. E. 405. 
Where married sister and her husband, after living 
with bachelor brother tett years until death of his 
mother, expressed a desire to establish a home of their 
own, but agreed tb remain with brother when he 
orally promised to devise his property to them if they 
would continue to live with him, and sister and hus-
band cared for brother for ten yeats until his death, 
and made improvements on property, sister held 
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entitled to specific performance of brother's alleged 
oral promise. Couch v. Cox, I8I S. E. 433· 
Oral contracts to convey land for services rendered 
are enforceable where agreement is certain and definite, 
acts of part performance are made in pursuance of 
agreement, and refusal of full execution would operate 
a fraud. Cannon v. Cannon, I 8 I S. E. 433· 
The witness Herman C. Thompson, testifying for the 
appellants, states with reference to the transaction: 
"A. He never said he would give me nothing. He 
said I was to pay him for it, but I never did do it. 
(Record p. I28). 
Q. What did he tell you he was going to charge you 
for that land? 
A. One hundred dollars for the lot. 
· Q. Did you believe and understand that if you came 
there and built the store and gave your father one 
hundred dollars that he would deed you that land? 
Did you believe that? 
A. Certainly I did. * * * * * 
Q. Don't you believe now that had you at .any time 
prior to your father's death tendered him one hundred 
dollars and asked for a deed that you would have 
gotten a deed to that tract of land on which that store-
house is located? 
A. I think I would. 
Q. You think you would. All right, you built your 
store on the faith of that understanding between you 
and your father, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir." 
(Record p. I33). 
And the appellant Judy C. Thompson, testifying in her 
own behalf, stated: 
"Q. Your husband told you that he had told Her-
man to go ahead and build the new storehouse on the 
new road? 
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A. Yes, sir. * * * * * 
(Record p. 144). 
Q. And if he chose to sell Herman a place to put 
the new store it was all right with you? 
A. It wasn't so all right, but I didn't say anything, 
I told you. 
(Record p. 145). 
Q. You stated that your husband told you that he 
ha~ told Herman to go ahead and put the store there? 
A. Yes, sir, I heard him say so. I don't remember 
he told Herman he could put it there, but he expected 
for Herman to pay him. 
Q. Expected Herman to pay him one hundred 
dollars? 
A. Yes, sir, that is what Herman said. 
Q. Expected for Herman to pay him for it. Is that 
what your husband told you? 
A. Yes, sir." 
(Record p. 148). 
And J. S. Thompson, the other appellant, testified as fol-
lows: 
"Q. You knew when Herman was building the store, 
didn't you? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know anything about what the under-
standing was between he and his father? 
A. No more than hearsay. 
Q. Did you ever hear your father say anything 
about it, or hear Herman say anything about it? 
A. I heard my father and Herman. 
Q. What did they say about it? 
A. They said Herman was to pay one hundred dol-
lars for it, from what I understood. 
Q. That was before the land was deeded to you, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And Herman did build the store and pa.id for it? 
A. Yes, sir." 
(Record p. I 55 ) . 
Point 2 
That R. D. Thompson was the real owner of the land 
at the time, although the legal title was vested in another; 
or that R. D. Thompson was the agent of: Judy C. Thomp-
son, the owner and holder of the legal title, and that he had 
a right to and did make a binding contract on her behalf 
to sell the land. 
The witness Herman C. Thompson, testifying for the 
appellants, stated: 
"Q. And at that time who was running the farm? 
A. He (R. D. Thompson) was running it himself. 
Stafford run it during the time he was paralyzed. 
(Record p. I 26) . 
A. He ( R. D. Thompson) was paralyzed but he 
told me to go ahead and build the storehouse there, 
you know, and to cut off a lot just enough for the store-
house, and have it surveyed off, and he would give me 
a deed to it,. but I never did do it and let it run and 
run on. 
(Record p. I27). 
Q. You didn't think it necessary to consult your 
mother when your father told you he would sell you 
this tract of land on which to build your store, did 
you? 
A. No. 
(Record p. I35). 
·The appellant Mrs. Judy C. Thompson, testified as fol-
lows: 
"Q. That is, your husband brought you a deed to 
sign and told you he wanted you to sign. the deed con-
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veying the property ·to He·rman and· you· went ahead 
and signed it. (Not the deed to the store, but to the 
dwelling)·.· · · · · 
A. I went .ahead and signed it. 
* * * * * 
A. He just spoke of it and said he told Herman 
to put it there. He didn't ask me if it was all right 
with me. He never asked me about anything of the 
kind, whether it was agreeable, and I didn't kick. 
(Record p. 144). 
Q. You let your husband deal with the farm in any 
fashion he saw fit then without your raising any objec-
tion, isn't that true? 
A. He generally done things right and to suit him-
self mostly. I didn't take his business in my hands 
at all. 
Q. And if he chose to sell Herman a place to put 
the new store; it was all right with you? 
A. It wasn't so all right, but I didn't say anything, 
I told you." 
(Record p. 145). 
By these acts, admitted by the appellant Judy C. Thomp-
son herself, she held R. D. -Thompson out as her agent 
to deal with such! matters, if, indeed, R. D. Thompson was 
not the real owner of the land I 
But from the testimony of John W. Harvey (Record p. 
61) and from that of T. R. Thompson (Record p. 64), 
and from the admissions of Judy C. Thompson herself 
(Record p. I 4 5, last above quoted) it conclusively appears 
that this appellant not only did not consideri hers.elf the real 
owner of the land but that she admitted that it actually 
belonged to her husband, R. D. Thompson. We quote her 
own wprds : "I did not take his business into my hands." 
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PoiDts 3 and 4 ... - 'I .i • 
. That her. grantor was ~ b~na lid~ pur~ha~.e<p£,~~~ ).~¥~ 
Without notice of defects m title,-that, In f~~~ .. ~~~~·· WF~e 
then no defects in title,-that her grantor Pt~~~~ a/J.. t1le 
improvements on the land, that he had a: right to ·aemahd a 
deed conveying to him good title, and that she as his grantee 
has a right to assert any claim to the land that he could 
have asserted. 
That the appellee controverts the appellants'. stat.em~nt 
that she took title to. the land with notice of .. ~e(~~§di~. t~ 
title and thereafter made improvements on it~~-·: :-.,·~;.]' ;·!'j· :t·; 
Points (3) and (4) are corollaries of each ·other, and 
are best treated together. 
The appellee made no improvements on the land. All 
improvements were put there by her grantor, who was a 
"bona fide purchaser without notice of defects in ti.tle," 
because, forsooth, when he purchased there we.re no defects 
in title. Any defects in title arising out of his acquisi~io~ of 
the land could easily have been cured by his demanding· ~ 
deed. This he states he would certainly have gotten.:··( Rec-
ord p. 1 33) ~. Whatever rights he had in the land he trans-
ferred to the ~ppellee, and she "stood in his shoes." 
Appellee's grantor's contract was made with the ·appellant 
Judy C. Thompson, or her agent, as set forth' ·aboye, and 
until the land was purchased by J. S. Thompson in 1933, 
title remained in her name. Any statements made by appellee 
relative to her title to the real estate in quest.i~<?~ _,could. not 
affect her title; for she has the same "right, .title. an~ 
interest" possessed by her grantor, as evidenced by deed 
from Herman C. Thompson to her (Record p. 43}. 
Point 5 
·That the identity of the land is fixed by monuments placed 
thereon by Herman C. Thompson, and the description of 
it is sufficient to .entitle her to specific ·performance of the 
contract, or that, if. the land is not sufficiently identified, 
then she, as the grantee of the .purchaser, should be per-
mitted to select the land within reasonable limits. 
The land is described by the witne~ses as "about one 
acre," and by one witness it is described by monuments 
on the ground. 1 
Preston Cox, a resident of the community since 1892, 
and well acquainted with all parties, states that at the time 
Herman C. Thompson was getting ready to build the new 
storehouse he (Thompson) asked him to help him "clear 
up the land and fix around" (Record p. 73). 
"Q. How much land was there in the space that 
you cleared out? 
A. About one acre of land." 
(Rec~rd p. 74). 
W. R. Giles, Section Foreman for the C. & 0. Ry. Co., 
a resident of the community, and acquainted with all parties 
and the land for twenty-two years, states the boundaries of 
the land specifically in the following language : 
"East of the store there was a garage built and the 
land was to go above the garage, back to the pasture 
fence, behind the store and back to a small building 
that he had erected on the west side of the store to 
the highway, and that would be about an acre." 
(Record p. 71). 
It ·is seldom indeed that a contract for the sale of land 
gives the metes and bounds of the land, even in the sale of 
city real estate, and yet such contract is held to be binding. 
This rule has been recognized by our court by its decisions 
in the following cases: 
. . 
"Where contract for sale of realty described prem-
ises as ~Duggan's Inn,' which was only property owned 
by vendors in county, and parties have in mind in nego-
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tiations entire property included with Duggan's Inn, and 
there was n~<dis~'ute' as to identitt br' iextent of land, 
description: -#-a·s· sufficiently definite to·, ~upport decree 
for specific p"t!rform~nce." Duggan: v. ·J(revonick, 192 
S. E. 737· 
Contract to convey land of specified width for boule-
vard, where vendee 'Yas given right to select one of 
three routes across vendor's land, HELD not too 
vague for enforcement. Shirley v. f7 anEvery, 159 Va. 
762, 167 S. E. 345· 
The contract for this right of way does not state the par-
ticular parcel of land that will be taken. The choice of one 
of three routes ·is left with the purchaser. The purchaser 
was allowed to make his choice, and specific performance 
was granted. 
In C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Williams Slate Co., I 29 S. E. 499, 
decided by the Special Court of Appeals of Virginia in 
I 92 5, a contract made in I 8 8 5 was held enforceable, which 
provided that a part of the land was "to be selected by the 
railroad company hereafter,'' and which described a portion 
of the land as "About half an acre of ground." 
"The Whi~comb letter may not be as definite and 
specific as might be desired, but when we consider: that 
it was written by a skilled engineer who went upon 
the property in person, and used language applicable 
to the peculiar physical conditions as seen and known 
by all parties in interest, including the uses to be made 
of the slate quarries along the track, we think the let-
ter is sufficiently definite to be enforced in equity. Yir-
ginian Ry. Co. v. Avis, I24 Va. 71 I, 98 S. E. 638, and 
Jones v. Gammon, I40 Va. 604, I25 S. E. 68I." 
"The description need not be given. with such par-
ticularity as to make a resort to extrinsic evidence 
unnecessary. Reasonable certainty is all that is 
required. Extrinsic proof is allowed in order to apply, 
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not to alter or vary, the written instrument." 36 Cyc. 
591; Preble v. Abrahams, 88 Cal. 245, 26 P. 99, 22 
Am. St. Rep. 301. Also cited with approval by C. & 
0. Ry. Co. v. Williams Slate Co., supra. 
Similarly, in the instant case, if it be held that the iden-
tity of the land as shown by the monuments described by 
the witness W. R. Giles (Record p. 71) is insufficient, then 
the purchaser, Herman C. Thompson, should be "illowed 
the right to make his selection (within the bounds of rea-
son). This right he has transferred to the appellee. 
Point& 
That neither she nor her grantor is guilty of laches, and 
that the appellants are guilty of laches in asserting their 
claim. 
Appellee's grantor had had possession and use of the 
land from 1927 to 1934 without any question being raised 
about his title, and under the impression that he could get 
a good deed to it at any time that he paid the purchase 
price of $1 oo.oo. He testified: 
"Q. Don't you believe now that had you at any time 
prior to your father's death tendered him one hundred 
dollars and asked for a deed that you would have 
gotten a deed to that tract of land on which that store-
-house is located? 
A. I think I would." 
(Record p. 135). 
And the appellee had the possession and use of the land 
from 1934 until 1937 before they raised any question about 
her right to it. In the meantime R. D. Thompson, one of 
the parties to the original contract, or an agent for one of 
the parties, w.ho conducted the negotiations, and a very 
material witness for the appellee, died, placing the appellee 
at a. serious disadvantage because of lack of proof, while 
the appellants ·have suffered no such loss. 
"Equity will not lend its aid to enforce stale 
demands, when by reason of the death of parties, loss 
of papers, loss of evidence, or other circumstances, it 
is difficult to do justice to the parties." Lyric Thea_tre 
Corp. v. P aughan, I9I S. E. 6oo. 
"Laches is a delay in the assertion of a right which 
works disadvantage to another." Hall v. Mortgage 
Sec. Corp. of America, 192 S. E. 145, IiI A. L. R. 
I 88. 
"Delay of highway authorities for five years before 
seeking enforcement of landowner's contract to con-
vey right of way HELD not laches, precluding relief, 
notwithstanding vendor's death, where general situa-
tion had not changed." Shirley v. J7 an Every, 167 S. 
E. 345, 159 Va. 762. 
"Lapse of time operates in equity as evidence of 
assent, acquiescence or waiver." Maze v. Benttett, -
W.Va.-, 171 S. E. 249. 
"This principle was recognized in Walker v. Beauch-
ler, 27 Gratt. 5 I 1, 528, where the defendant's claim 
for improvements was allowed, on the ground that by 
his acquiescence and laches the plaintiff was estopped 
from contesting it. And also to the same effect is 
Southall v. McKeand, I Wash. 366; see also Pom. 
Eq., sec. I 241, note." Effinger v. Hall, 8 I Va. 94· 
Point 7 
That the appellant Judy C. Thompson is guilty not only 
of laches in asserting her claim, buti is guilty of legal fraud 
in permitting the improvements to be made, with full knowl-
edge on her part that they were being made and with full 
knowledge that the purchaser had bought the land by con-
tract and was making the improvements -under the belief 
that the contract was enforceable and that he could and 
would get a good title to the land. 
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"There can be no difficulty about the law which is 
to govern this question. The only difficulty which can 
arise upon it must be about the fact~ * * * * * . So if 
a party having a title to an estate should stand by 
and allow an innocent purchaser to expend money upon 
the estate, without giving him notice, he would not be 
permitted by a court of equity to assert that title 
against such purchaser, at least not without fully indem-
nifying him for all his expenditures." Graeme v. Cul-
len, 23 Gratt. 266 (302). 
Quite clearly Judy C. Thompson, if not herself doing 
so, by her husband, R. D. Thompson, acting as her agent, 
made a contract with Herman C. Thompson to sell him 
land for the erection of a store. She saw him erect the 
store and living within 7 5 yards all the time, did not object, 
but in fact, apparently approved his actions. (Record p. 
I 4 5) . A court of equity will not allow such conduct on the 
part of appellant, and then permit her to recover without 
compensating for improvements. Graeme v. Cullen, supra. 
Point 8 
That the appellant J. S. Thompson (co-defendant with 
Judy C. Thompson in the trial court), before he acquired 
an interest in the land, knew of the circumstances of the 
placing of improvements thereon by the purchaser, and was 
affected with notice of the claim of the purchaser. 
The appellant J. S. Thompson himself, testified (Record 
p. I 55), that he knew the storehouse was being built on 
the land; that he knew that Herman C. Thompson had 
agreed to pay $100.00 for it, and that he knew all these 
facts before he acquired any interest in the land. 
"D makes a verbal agreement with E for an 
exchange of land, but afterwards refused to perform 
the agreement. At the time D did not have legal title. 
E brings suit to compel specific performance of the 
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contract, and by the highest court in the state, it is 
ascertained and adjudicated that he is entitled to have 
the contract performed. F being fully informed of 
these facts, of the existence of the contract, of its 
binding obligation, and of the pendency of a suit to 
enforce it, cooperates with D in obtaining and using a 
deed conveying the land to himself, and by virtue of 
said deed, recovers in ejectment against E. It was held 
that it is inequitable to allow F the advantage of a 
deed obtained under these circumstances, which amount 
to bad faith and fraud, that he should be perpetually 
enjoined from all proceedings under same, and that 
D and F should be decreed to convey the legal title 
to E, by sufficient deeds for that purpose." Parrill v. 
McKinley, 6 W. Va. 68. 
"If this charge had been proved by the evidence, 
the complainants might have made good their ground 
of fraud." Graeme v. Cullen, supra. 
It is submitted that J. S. Thompson under the circum-
stapces should not be allowed to here deny appellee's rights, 
and thus perpetrate a fraud on her. 
Point 9 
.That the trial court, having reached the conclusion 
(though erroneously) that the description of the land was 
too vague to warrant an award of specific performance, 
rightly awarded the appellee damages. 
This proposition is abundantly sustained by the case of 
Effinger v. Hall, Sr Va. 94, which has hereinbefore been 
discussed in detail under the head of "Argument." (Page 
s, supra). 
PointlO 
That the bill of complainant alleges, the testimony shows, 
and the appellants admit that the appellant Judy C. Thomp-
son is insolvent, and that a judgment for damages against 
2.0 
her would be unavailing, if the appellee sought remedy in 
a court of law; and, therefore~· ;a court of equity only 
call ~r~~t. h,~r f~ll relief.. . . 1 ·:. •• 
"Thus, a bill for the speCific performance of parol' ' 
a,gr~ernent, which has been denied because of a failure 
to. 'make out a proper case, will be retained by a court 
, · ·of equity, for the purpose of granting compensation to 
·one who, ·on the strength of such agreement, has made 
·valuable improvements, and whose remedy at law is 
incomplete." 10 R. C. L. pp. 373, pg. 121. 
· · "It may be conceded that the cross-bill states a case 
upon which Cochran would be entitled to recover 
damages in a proper action, and that the allegation of 
Bunting's insolvency would give a court of equity juris-
diction to hear and determine a controversy which 
otherwise 'would be entertained with propriety only in 
a court of law." Bunting v. Cochran, 99 Va. 558. 
·. · · "But despite this principle, insolvency is often an 
' ··important circumstance prompting a court of equity· 
to grant relief, especially by way of injunction or spe-
cific performance, where otherwise the plaintiff would 
be relegated to an action at law." 10 R. C. L. pp. 278, 
.pg. 20. 
· "To oust a court of equity of jurisdiction, however, 
it is not sufficient that there is a remedy at law, but it 
·.must be :..a plain, adequate and efficient remedy." 10 
R. C. L. pp. 275, pg. 18. 
J'l S. Thompson was not a party to the original contract 
s~t .up in this cause, and, therefore, the appellee could not · 
re.cQver against him in an action at law, and at most in an 
action at law, she could recover only a judgment against 
Judy ~- Tho~ps~n, who is the life tenant and is entitled to 
the_ present. .u_se .. of the land, and who, as set forth above, 
is insolv~nt, and, therefore, the appellee, if left to her 
remedy at law, would, in effect, have no remedy under the 
drcum.stanc~s .of this case. 
Point 11 
4 • • • 
That the appellants recognized the claim of appellee to 
th~ land both in their pleadings and by th.eir acts. 
J. S. ·Thompson, in his amended answer, states that: 
"Respondent is willing that the complainant remove 
the said storehouse and such improvements as have 
been put on the said real estate by Herman C. Thomp-
son, as he believes that the presence of the said store-
house on said land has materially depreciated the value 
of the residue of the farm." (Record p. 53). 
If she had any right to the buildings, then she had a 
right in the land on which they were situated, and of which 
they were a part, and that right was a fee simple title. 
Again, the witness W. J. Bennett (Record p. 88) stated 
that when he was negotiating for the sale of the entire farm, 
including tlie storehouse and land in question, the appel-
lant J. S. Thompson told him he would have to get the 
approval of the appellee and would have to make provision 
for her to be paid for her interest in the land. 
In Mann v. Mann, 165 S. E. 525, cited by the appellants, 
the court decreed that the contract was unenforceable on 
account of indefiniteness in the amount of the consideration 
to be paid for the land, but it also decreed that "at the 
defendant's request" the complainant should be repaid by 
the defendant the amount of cash money that he had 
invested in the land. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellee confidently submits that she has answered 
each of the appellants' reasons for asking a reversal of the 
decree, as set out on Page 1 5 of their Brief: 
· " (I). Because it fails to connect Mrs. Judy C. 
Thompson with the giving of the lot." 
·22 
This is fully answered ·by .. the· quotation· from Judy C. 
Thompson's own testimony quoted under Poipt (I) above. 
(Pa~· ·9, .·;.st;zprf!) • .'. · · 
. " ( 2) .. Because the whole of the evid~nce shows th~ 
contract was ·not in writin~g." · 
·- ·A parol agreement· to sell land, foiowed by possession 
and improvements erected by a purchaser withou-t notice 
·Of defects in, title~ ·is enforceable. Cannon v. Cannon, I 8 I 
.s. E. 43·3, cited under Point (I) above. 
"(3). Because there was not any description of the 
land that was given." 
.The extent of the land is show·n by the evidence of 
Preston Cox, who· helped clear it, at the request of the 
purchaser, and by the evidence of W. R. Giles, who 
described monuments placed thereon by the purchaser. It 
wiil· 'be noted. that \the boundaries of the land were thus 
defined by the acts of the purchaser himself, amd acquiesced 
in· by the appellant Judy C. Thompson over a period o!f 
. . 
:years. · 
" ( 4). Because the evidence of what R. D. Thomp-
.· .-. . son arid Herman C. Thompson said was hearsay." 
R. D. Thompson was a party to the ori.ginal agreement, 
o.r at least--he was the authorized agent1 for the owner, and 
Herman C. ·Thompson was himself a party to the agree-
ment_, and any statem~ts made by them subsequent to the 
transaction are admissible as declarations against interest. 
" ( 5). Because the agency of R. D. Thompson for 
Judy C. Thompson is not proved, or charged in the 
bills." 
The agency of R. D. Tlrompson is ab1ill!ldantly proved, 
and is indeed practica1ly admitted, by the testimony o·f the 
~ppellant Judy C. Thompson herself, quoted under Point 






·The appellee further _earnestly submits that the testi-
mony introduced ar;td. the authorities quoted by her. clearly 
show that. ( 1 ) she ·as the grantee of the purchaser is 
entitled to specific performance of the contract in question 
and to a deed to the land, either as shown by the monu-
ments now on it, or to be selected by her, as the case may 
be, or ( 2) that she is entitled to full compensation in this 
suit for improvements placed on the land by her grantor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDNA c. THOMPSON, 
By: S. J. THOMPSON and 
W. H. JoRDAN, 
Her Attorneys. 
